Three Hulls, No Tankers

Every ship sunk in the Iran war has been a dry-cargo vessel with an Emirati owner or manager, and none has been a tanker, although tankers take most of Iran's fire. The second and third losses came within a day of Washington declaring that it controls the Strait of Hormuz. Whether that profile reflects Iranian choice, the lane these ships use or simply how hard a loaded tanker is to sink is the question the next losses will answer.

On Tuesday Central Command said American forces and regional partners "clearly control the Strait of Hormuz", and that they had helped move more than 19 million barrels of crude through it the day before. That same day a projectile struck GFS Pride, a small Singapore-flagged container ship, as it crossed the strait. Fire took hold and the ship went down off Oman's Musandam peninsula after all 21 crew were taken off. The Revolutionary Guard said a ship had hit mines on what it called an unauthorised route. Singapore's maritime authority described a projectile.

The bulk carrier Cape Dao sank in the same window. It had been hit north-east of Khasab on 23 September, killing one seafarer, and a salvage attempt failed. On Wednesday a second Singapore-flagged container ship, GFS Giselle, took a projectile in the hull and limped to anchorage. Iran struck at least 24 vessels in the fortnight to 11 October, six of them in a single day.

Casualty records kept by the International Maritime Organization show three ships sunk since the war began on 28 February. The first was the container ship Safeen Prestige, hit on 4 March. The three share a profile. Each carried dry cargo, Safeen Prestige was owned in Abu Dhabi and both October losses are run by managers based in the Emirates. None was a tanker, yet tankers absorb the bulk of Iran's attacks, including a record week of at least twelve tanker strikes that ended on 5 October.

Three explanations fit that profile and the evidence cannot yet choose between them. Engineering is the plainest. A loaded crude carrier is divided into compartments and is notoriously hard to sink, while a small feeder or bulker is far less forgiving, so the losses may record which hulls fail under fire. Geography offers a second reading. Iran treats the southern lane through Omani waters as unauthorised and hits the traffic that uses it, and that lane may carry an unusually high share of small Emirati-managed ships. Deliberate choice is the third and the weakest. Dividing Washington from the Gulf monarchies is among Tehran's assessed aims, and the Emirates are the region's most exposed commercial hub. Three wrecks, with no count of who else sails the strait, cannot carry that reading, and it is the one most likely to travel.

What is settled is narrower and more useful. American protection in the strait is organised around tankers, and Central Command reports its success in barrels. The ships now going to the bottom sit outside both. A control claim that counts crude can be accurate on its own terms on the day a container ship sinks. The trade carrying the war's losses is the one that moves grain, fertiliser and manufactured goods, and a UN official warned this week that without an agreed corridor for fertiliser through the strait, parts of Asia and Africa face a food crisis within weeks.

Two things would decide between the readings. One is the ownership of the ships Iran has struck and failed to sink. The other is the first tanker to go down, after seven months in which Iran has hit tankers repeatedly and sunk none.